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SUBJECT: KENYA EAC MEETS TO DISCUSS SECURITY SITUATION

Classified By: DCM Pamela J. Slutz, reason 1.4g

11. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Nairobi's Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) convened Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on 18 January 2008 to review Tripwires for Nairobi and approve a separate set of Tripwires for Chief Of Mission (CoM) facilities in Kisumu. END SUMMARY.

12. (C) EAC reviewed the tripwires for Nairobi and determined that we remain in "standfast" mode. The call by the ODM leaders for an end of mass actions/demonstrations beginning next week should go a long way to ending confrontation and disruptions. ODM leadership has called for boycotts and labor strikes of enterprises/companies owned by government/PNU elite, to begin next week. We will monitor the situation to identify any offices and/or factories that might be targeted in/near USG residences or offices. Ambassador held a Town Hall meeting with non-official Americans, attended by over 100 people.

13. (C) For the purposes of the Emergency Action Plan, the EAC has developed and approved trip wires for three crisis categories (Terrorism, Civil Unrest and Natural Disaster), that apply to both Nairobi and Kisumu, where we have USG personnel (see below). EAC determined that there were no special circumstances in Kisumu that would warrant different (than Nairobi) tripwires and responses. The EAC recognizes that no list of possible crises and contingencies can be comprehensive, and that the trip wires discussed below are only a starting point.
Note: Tripwires for Kisumu were formalized and approved by the EAC on January 18, 2008, as a separate document in section 1420 of the Mission Kenya EAP.

Standfast:

14. (C) Response: Limitations on TDY travel to Nairobi/Kisumu to allow only visitors whose travel is essential; restrictions on travel by CoM personnel; possible restrictions on non-essential activities, events and services.

Terrorism:

-- General threat of attack with some degree of specificity (timeline) against U.S. or Western interests.

Civil Disorder:

-- Widespread negative public reaction to an act of U.S. foreign policy or military action. Statements by influential public figures that could be interpreted as incitement to civil disorder against U.S. facilities. Wider or more severe negative public reaction to an act or domestic policy of the Government of Kenya (GOK), statements by influential opposition figures indicate desire to organize civil disorder.

-- Spontaneous acts of disorder indicating wider negative reaction to local economic events or policies (e.g., fuel price increases, labor problems, land/farm issues). Nonviolent protests in Nairobi/Kisumu (for any reason) resulting in the temporary blockage of streets and/or restriction of the freedom of movement of CoM personnel over a period of several days at a time or more.

-- Violent confrontations prevent safety of travel and/or delivery of services over a period of several days at a time or more.

Natural Disaster:

-- Natural disaster (earthquake, flooding, etc.) occurs, with physical damage to CoM facilities in Nairobi/Kisumu sufficient to prevent normal operations.

-- Partial power, water and fuel outages that impair normal CoM operations in Nairobi/Kisumu.

-- Verifiable reports of a serious, non-contained, potentially fatal, health crisis disease (epidemic or other contagion), along with questions about the GOK and international community's ability to adequately respond.

Authorized Departure

15. (C) Response: Drawdown

Terrorism

-- Evidence of a reduced GOK willingness and/or ability to protect U.S. interests, such as a pullback or reduction of the GOK patrols around CoM facilities in Nairobi/Kisumu by police or para-military General Service Unit (GSU).

-- A failure by GOK to improve or maintain current security around Kenya's major international airports, ports, and other facilities, or major tourist sites.

-- Evidence of increased terrorist threats against U.S. or Western interests.

-- Specific and credible threat information naming the CDC, MRU, Embassy or its personnel as imminent targets.

Civil Unrest:

-- Sustained civil disorder (daily demonstrations increasing in size) results in considerable interruptions of daily life and/or CoM operations. Demonstrations become focused on expatriate or U.S. interests and/or facilities. Occupants of diplomatic-registered vehicles are harassed, blocked or stoned.

-- Police response to civil disorder displays a lack of ability to control protesters, acts of violence against passersby, or other evidence of a decline in the Authorities, ability to control security situation.

-- Indications that sustained civil disorder may impede scheduled air travel to/from Kenya.

Natural Disaster:

-- Power, water and fuel outages so severe that normal occupancy of CoM residences is not possible. Shortages of some foodstuffs and closure of some, but not all, food stores. Formal closure in mid-year of the International School of Kenya and Rosslyn Academy in Nairobi and of Kisumu International School in Kisumu.

-- Damage to road infrastructure so severe that normal movement within Nairobi/Kisumu is not possible for an extended period

-- Outbreak of disease (cholera, dysentery, typhoid, etc.) as a result of the disaster; outbreaks generally limited to economically disadvantaged sections of Nairobi/Kisumu.

-- Other critical medical/health emergency (disease epidemic or other contagion) that directly threatens CoM personnel in a manner that cannot be adequately addressed by CDC, MRU, the Embassy, or local medical infrastructure.

Ordered Departure

16. (C) Response: Evacuation

Terrorism:

-- Specific and credible or verifiable threat information that cannot be counteracted.

-- GOK failure to protect CoM Facilities or informs the U.S. that it is not capable of protecting CoM facilities.

-- An actual attack with a continuing threat to CoM facilities.

Civil Unrest:

-- Demonstrators or group breach perimeter of any CoM facilities. Authorities are unable or not willing to remove the trespassers and prevent another takeover.

-- Repeated violent confrontations between demonstrators and police/military, possibly involving the use of live ammunition, within walking distance of CoM facilities or residences.

-- Authorities inform the Embassy that it can no longer guarantee security at CoM facilities in Nairobi/Kisumu.

-- Authorities begin to leave Nairobi/Kisumu or evacuate their family members from Kenya.

Natural Disaster:

-- Power, and water shortages so severe that CoM residences cannot be occupied and Nairobi/Kisumu facilities cannot operate except on an extremely limited basis.

-- Fuel shortages so severe that continued airport operations are not assured or fuel becomes so scarce as to call into question adequate reserves for overland evacuation.

-- Food shortages so severe as to call into question adequate sources of food for Nairobi/Kisumu personnel; closure of most or all food stores.

-- Outbreaks of contagious diseases so severe that Nairobi/Kisumu neighborhoods are affected.

-- Medical/Health emergency that requires evacuation for treatment is an imminent threat to Nairobi/Kisumu personnel and families; local authorities unable to control the outbreak.

17. (SBU) On January 18, CDC/Nairobi officer traveled to Kisumu.

DCM, Management Officer, DRSO, and CDC/Nairobi Chief held a teleconference with Center for Disease Control (CDC) and Walter Reed Medical Research Unit (MRU) personnel in Kisumu regarding the present environment. Kisumu representatives reported schools were open, streets empty, and shops closed for fear of looting. Daily contact amongst all entities continues to ensure that safety, security, and services are provided to Kisumu personnel.

18. (SBU) Points of Contact for this matter are DCM Pamela Slutz and DRSO Jeff Roberts.

RANNEBERGER